Yasir Qadhi on slavery in Islam

Some thoughts on this thoughtful presentation from probably the most prominent Muslim traditionalist in America. I very much respect his attempts to engage this serious and important issue. Here are some points where I agree and where I disagree:

1. I appreciate how he tries to contextualize slavery, the terms for it, and the meaning of it in the context of different times. This is an important first step.

2. He is right that slavery (broadly understood) was a universal practice across many cultures globally.

3. He is incorrect that Islam was the first belief system to create rules about slavery. Not sure how he could claim this. He later claims that many other cultures had no 'rules' about slavery. Also incorrect.

4. He is also slightly in error about the 'legitimate' source of slaves in Islam. I think that is probably because he's focused on deriving notions of 'legitimacy' from text, rather than from actual practice. That is a long side debate which I will not take up here.

5. The virtues of manumission are frequently mentioned in the books of law. The interpretation we give to this practice, however, is KEY. See point 7.

6. I find the argument that, because there is no specific law legislating FOR slavery, therefore Muslims don't need it and can preserve the tradition intact...interesting. I'm not fully convinced, mainly because I don't think Qadhi has fully faced the historical and epistemological difficulties of this position.

7. I'm glad to see he raises this past disagreement among the ulama. But he studiously avoids the colonial context of abolition (I am sure he is aware of it, as he has spoken out on the impact of colonialism on Muslims before). This silence is curious. If Qadhi is a traditionalist, and he follows the pious ancestors, then what right does he have to call abolition 'more humane' than previous practices? How can he avoid that abolition was almost always and everywhere forced on Muslim countries by colonial invaders? Finally, we should ask ourselves, how does Qadhi know the INTENTION (his word) of Allah apart from The Quran and the actual practice of the early community? The companions took female captives as slaves or sex slaves (there are plenty of documented instances of this in the hadith tradition). By most accounts, even the Prophet practiced this. Isn't Qadhi saying that the generation of Muslims now who have gotten rid of slavery know better than the early Salaf and the Prophet did, since the later generations were the one to fulfill what he claims is the internal logic of the tradition? I would like to know more about how Qadhi would square this with his veneration for the early companions, and the Prophet himself.

8. I have said it once, and I will say it again: The abolitionist hermeneutic is a modernist hermeneutic. And once you have accepted a modernist 'logic' of history where you believe (as Qadhi seems to here, though implicitly) that history has moved progressively towards abolishing a practice that the early companions openly practiced without sanction, then you have rendered most articulations of traditionalism anachronistic. Progressive history makes a lot of traditionalists nervous, because it undermines their absolutist claims to an 'ethical ground'. Keep this in mind whenever traditionalists accuse liberals of undermining the basis of a 'traditional' Islamic ethics. More often than not the 'tradition' they practice is as modern and anachronistic as anything Muslim progressives have yet dreamed of.

9. I say all of this, not to beat a tired old dead horse, but because I think there is a lot of misunderstanding and emotional polemics on both sides of this issue. We need more clear sighted analysis. I think Qadhi himself might benefit from a serious engagement with scholars working on the links between slavery and law, both in Atlantic and Indian Ocean contexts.

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Some Thoughts on Islam, Feminism and Tradition

Some Further thoughts on islam and Feminism after reading Daniel Haqiqatjou's post: https://muslimskeptic.com/2016/10/15/a-parade-of-contradictions-when-feminists-are-inconsistent/

 A lot of Muslim traditionalists rightly point to tensions between Islam and feminism. There is plenty of real tension between the two, otherwise there wouldn't be such a vociferous debate about their compatibility. One recent blogger on this issue even called Muslim feminism an oxymoron. It is his position that Islam has a secure methodology for finding the truth, and is in no need of reform from feminists. (https://medium.com/she-zaadi/islamic-feminist-oxymoron-level-over-9000-3c15f773d975#.z0py6a74t)

 One of the ways that Muslims who argue against feminism have been able to argue is through the powerful idea that they are the stewards of something sacred and unchanging. Yet many traditionalists I've dialogued with seem unaware that the tradition has in times past absorbed many many foreign ideas and made these ideas its own. This absorption did not proceed through a strict methodological logic. Rather most of the absorptions were the product of historical contingency. And yet the tradition survived.

The abolition of slavery was one such foreign idea. A good analogy for the debates currently roiling the ummah around feminism are the debates around the abolition of slavery in the late 19th century. Then, as now, the issue was the relationship to a powerful bundle of discourses about human rights emanating from the West. The question was: is abolishing slavery legally justifiable?

Scholars were divided into two camps at the time. One camp, the traditionalists, rightly pointed out that there was no legal basis for abolition in the fiqh tradition, that the meanings of Quranic verses around slavery were unchanging and not to be abrogated, and that to follow the European countries in abolishing slavery would be a reprehensible innovation. One of the 20th century's most illustrious Sufi Sunni scholars, Yusuf al-Nabhani, held these views. al-Nabhani doubted the sufficiency of human reasoning to abrogate that which God in his book did not prohibit. He and others believed that the abolition of slavery was a doctrine aimed at weakening Islam. The textual criterion was self sufficient, and one could only err in assuming an independent standard for moral progress. In short, the traditionalists then were making the same arguments against abolition that many Muslims now make against feminism.

 The second group were the Muslim modernists/reformers. They argued that the new circumstances of the time called for new rulings and new interpretations on issues previously thought settled, such as the role of women, and the legality of slavery. They argued that abolishing slavery was the right thing to do, Islamically. They used Quran and Hadith, but more abstractly, since there was no clear statement about the evil of slavery therein. But to them, freedom was the essence of the teachings of Islam. Their arguments were premised on the idea that Islam, as a vehicle of human progress, has the capacity to accept change, if it leads to beneficial moral progress, thus assuming that the standard for progress exists independently of the textual criterion. (Amal Ghazal "Debating Slavery and Abolition in the Arab Middle East")

 Something strange seems to have happened in this divide on the way to our present moment. The modernists are still the modernists, still arguing from moral essence, often using an implicit societal standard. But the traditionalists by and large accepted the modernist view about abolition, and made it their own. And they did this without much sound traditional Islamic legal reasoning to support it. Although this was the right thing to do, it also, In my view, fatally undermined any authority the current conservative argument from Islamic tradition has in the contemporary world.

 Muslims the world over, of all ideologies, rightly regard all kinds of slavery with a moral repugnance. Their attitude shows to what degree Muslims are inheritors (and even champions) of Western abolitionist assumptions about modern human rights. A true empirically sound traditionalist position on Islam is extremely rare in our modern world, because a true empirically sound traditionalism would have to acknowledge that abolition of slavery has no unequivocal textual and legal basis in Islam. In other words, a truly consistent traditionalist could still potentially regard slavery as something to be practiced within the limits set out for it in the Quran and Hadith, not as a morally outrageous anachronism. Most if not all Muslims are modernists, even many Salafis, because they accept the assumption that slavery is inherently immoral. Once you start extracting the idea of 'moral essence' separate and above the clear meaning of the text, you can no longer call yourself a traditionalist.

 I wrote all this because, if you're Muslim and feminist, there is little need to spend a lot of time worrying overly much about contradictions that alleged traditionalists point out between feminism and Islam, from an empirical standpoint. Most, if not all traditionalists themselves have their own empirical contradictions to deal with in the way they formulate tradition. Next time a traditionalist asks 'why, if feminism is so important, there is no mention of it in the Quran?', ask them 'why, if abolishing slavery is so important, is there no mention of it in the Quran?' The abolitionist hermeneutic IS the feminist hermeneutic. The Islamic tradition has survived inconsistencies greater than this, and it will survive traditionalist hostility to feminism, and feminism's alleged contradictions to Islam. It will survive, not because of human vigilance, but because of our nearly boundless ability to keep changing, all the while imagining we inherit our moral code from an unbroken chain of tradition.

 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, abolition also became accepted because the formerly enslaved struggled for knowledge, rights, and attained positions of religious authority. Similarly, a true and profound synthesis between Islam and feminism is already occurring because women are struggling for knowledge, rights and for attaining positions of religious authority. Each and every tradition is an arena of social struggle. The tradition itself will change as a result of these struggles. Accepting those changes will be difficult, especially for men. But I am confident the changes themselves will strengthen Islam and make its conceptions of equality more and more robust. (Bernard Freamon "Conceptions of equality and slavery in Islamic law")

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Muslims in Kenya Back Kadhi Courts in New Draft Constitution

Nairobi — Muslim religious leaders on Friday said they were ready to dialogue with Christians on kadhi's courts.

The head of the National Muslim Leaders Forum Abdullahi Abdi, speaking at a press conference at Jamia Mosque in Nairobi, said they meet some of the Christians at the Inter-Religious Council, and would be willing to speak to them on the nature of the courts.

He said Kenyans, will live together after the referendum. "We are at the beginning of campaigns. The winner will take it," he said.

He declared their unanimous support for the draft constitution and launched campaigns to have more Kenyans register as voters."We believe (the draft constitution) has many virtues. We call upon Kenyans to vote 'Yes' in large numbers," the leaders said in a statement read by Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims chairman Prof Abdulghafur El-Busaidy.

At a separate press conference at Parliament Buildings, Dujis MP Aden Duale said Muslims are not backing the proposed constitution merely because it includes kadhi's courts.

Mr Duale said those supporting the proposed laws were especially pleased about the proposed devolution, the bill of rights, resource allocation and the pure presidential system.

The Dujis MP said the debate over the courts is not warranted given that they would be in Kenyan law whether or not the proposed laws are passed.

The constitution was passed by Parliament, but the Catholic Church and some evangelical groups have vowed to fight it because of its provisions on abortion and kadhi's courts.

Christian leaders are also opposed to the retention of kadhi's courts in the proposed constitution under Article 169 and 170, which limit their authority to disputes over personal status, marriage, divorce or inheritance, where all the parties are Muslims and agree to take the case to a Kadhi.Federation of Kenya Employers chairman Patrick Obath also joined the Yes proponents and said at a press conference: "As concerned citizens, we think the constitution should be adopted."The African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption urged Kenyans to vote for the laws, saying that passing the draft would boost the fight against graft. They said the new laws would establish "strong, transparent, independent and accountable arms of government." They urged Kenyans to read the proposed draft before the referendum.

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Religion and Approaches to History (A Peoples History of Monotheism?)

Picking up where A. Thompson left off in his insightful discussion of monotheistic religion: One thing all religions need to do, above all, in order to make themselves more relevant and less reactionary, is to avoid making essentializing statements about their history. Notwithstanding the enormous positive impact Christianity and Islam (to name the two major examples) have had on world culture and world society, there is an almost unbearably facile tendency on the part of some of their adherents to engage in a complete whitewashing of the more 'unsavory' aspects of that history. The violence and corruption of the medieval church, the at times rapacious conquest of the early Muslims--these histories are either conveniently forgotten or, if they are mentioned at all, made external to the faith, i.e. they were just a few bad apples. This tendency was aptly described by Wilfred Cantwell Smith:

"This process [of recovering lost history] turns disruptive only when, as has sometimes happenned, the grip of the need to defend is tightened to the point where this delight in greatness, this compensatory self-satisfaction, becomes the compulsive cause rather than the honest result of historical reconstruction. Historiography is then designed alsmot explicitly to nourish and to support one's predelictions. It seeks not to analyse or to understand the past, but to glorify it; that is to glorify oneself. The purpose is not investigation but aggrandizement, not intellectual accuracy but emotional satisfaction."

Smith, as usual, has a penetrating insight here. There is a certain approach to religion and history which sees religion as being 'under attack' by secular forces (Although such charges are usually trumped up, since religion did far more to indict itself than secularism ever could, the motive power of the perception is nevertheless real) and thus rushes to write a history absolving X religion, showing it to be the perfect way, the answer to all our problems, WAAAY better than those other religions, and what would we do without it? While I cannot accept the ignorant rantings of such blowhard atheists as Christopher Hitchens, I equally cannot accept these canards employed in religion's defense. Bottom line, since I cannot accept either approach, I need a new method. Simply defending religion through idealizations and essentializations of its quite checkered history is not only intellectually dishonest, it is bad for the soul.

I define religion as a way of getting closer to God. This obviously includes a great deal under its umbrella. The difficulty comes when X religion claims Y religion just 'doesn't get it'. They are infidels or kaffirs, or they worship cows, or they drink the blood of Christ, or they are going to hell because they don't have the right belief ABOUT God. The sincerity with which these views are propounded do not lessen their incredible shortsightedness. Christians claim Islam is the 'religion of the sword'. Muslims accuse Christians of deifying Christ without bothering to understand what the faith of a Christian might mean for him/her personally. Jews and Christians also battle it out over the divinity of Christ. Now there is nothing wrong with believing in something and standing to defend it. But such an approach has a law of diminishing returns. Instead of trying to get closer to God, many religious adherents are frantically trying to convince everyone else how naturally great and superior their own belief is! And in doing so, they strain logic and credulity.

As a convert to Islam, I wondered for a long time what it truly 'meant' to be Muslim in an ultimate sense. And the best and most general idea I could come up with, after considering all the evidence, both internally and externally, is that Islam is a joyful response to a Divine Reality. I have my own reasons why I consider it 'better' than other religions in this respect, but these are mostly private and personal. Nevertheless, in actual fact, there is a practical tension between Islam as an inner response and Islam as a public cultural matrix one shares with and participates in. Thus the most forward thinking intellectuals now working in the Islamic tradition are those who propose that a distinction should be made between the nucleus of the Islamic revelation (the Meccan revelations), and those rules (the Medinan revelations) which were brought to the early community, and thus constitute an integral part of the social milieu of the Prophet.

The need for this approach becomes clear if we compare the ideals of an Islam touted by its public boosters (The "Islam is the solution for everything" people) and the actual treatment of human beings under modern day Islamic state experiments. Without engaging in an essentialization of Western values, I think it is safe to say that the three foremost examples of Islamic state implementation today--Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran--have an absolutely horrible record with regard to the treatment of religious minorities, not to mention women. All obfuscations aside then, if Islam is in its essence aiming for what is supremely right and completely just, then it cannot justify such things as the penalty for adultery, the equivalence of a man's testimony with that of two women, slavery, the status of the 'other' under shari'a, and so forth.

Now apologists will argue in response that we cannot ignore context, and it is certainly true that the penalties outlined in Quran and hadith were not always applied. It is true that manumitting a slave was considered an eternally meritorious act in Islam, unlike the on-the-ground reality of the institution of chattel slavery in the West. It is true that at the time of the Prophet, Islam actually improved the rights of women in that society. But it is the height of foolish arrogance to assume that, for all times and places, implementing these legal penalties and rules as a legal code in will result in the emancipation of women or the establishment of God's justice. Islamic countries, even those where shari'a is implemented through the judicial code, have outlawed slavery, admitting that the Prophet's pronouncements about it were aimed at its eradication. This is patently a social and contextual judgment, so why is it so difficult to undertake the same move when it comes to rights of women or other ideas?

Getting back to my original statement, it is obvious that Christian and Islamic histories have distinct and unique approaches to politics and political theory. Their histories overlap significantly but, as Carl Brown has explained, they developed into world religions out of vastly different social situations. Along the way, power became an emblem to implement Divine Reality, and Divine Reality became the de facto and often de jure explanation for an excercise of political power, however arbitrary. In the process the two were thoroughly confused. Therefore one step towards removing the confusion and telling an accurate history of religion is to untangle the two. Let the Divine do its work, as it continues to do, in the lives of people across the globe. Inshallah, if religious people can learn to think more historically they will recognize what M. Kane called "A Peoples History of Monotheism". That is, the histories of those who opposed rigid dogma, corrupt authority, and worship of idols. Those who eschewed violent conquest for power's sake, but promoted active resistance to authoritarian government. Those who felt compelled to respond to a Divine calling, something irresistible which called them, not to withdraw from the world, but to engage it in the most wholistic and organic way they were capable of.

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Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha's Court Statement

We have brought your attention to Ustadh Mahmoud before; here is a video of his statement before the court while on trial for charges of apostasy, a trial that led to his execution and the suppression of his movement, the Republican Brothers.

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Contemporary Islamic Thinkers You Should Know: Abdullah an-Naim

From Wikipedia:
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im is the Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law. His specialties include human rights in Islam and cross-cultural issues in human rights, and he is the director of the Religion and Human Rights Program at Emory. He is also a senior fellow of Emory's Center for the Study of Law and Religion. An-Naim was formerly the Executive Director of the African bureau of Human Rights Watch.
Born in 1950, An-Naim is originally from Sudan, where he was greatly influenced by the Islamic reform movement of Mahmoud Mohamed Taha. He is a naturalized American citizen, but retains Sudanese citizenship.

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Divorce Rate Falls in Oman as more men take second wives

Divorce Rate Falls in Oman

MUSCAT // The rate of divorce in Oman has fallen as a result of a trend in which men are increasingly taking second wives while keeping their first to prevent the break-up of their families, marriage counsellors say.

According to statistics from the ministry of religious affairs, the divorce rate in Oman dropped by 12 per cent in 2008 from the previous year. At the same time, the number of men taking second wives increased by more than 20 per cent.

“It is a way of making compromises… between men and their first wives,” Fatma Fallahy, a 74-year-old marriage counsellor, said. “Men say: ‘I will keep the first family as a dutiful husband, but I need to marry a second wife to keep my libido up’.”

In Islam, men can have up to four wives, provided they can afford to treat them equally, both emotionally and financially.

But when men decide to marry again, their first wives’ emotional well-being is usually the last of their concerns. “It is good that there are fewer divorces now; that prevents family break-up, but women still don’t understand why their husbands would want to add another wife when things are going well at home,” Ms Fallahy said.

For Aisha Suleimany, a 46-year-old bank supervisor, her married life does not have the same meaning now that she shares her husband of 24 years with a much younger woman. Her 51-year-old husband married a 22-year-old woman six months ago.

“What did I do wrong? I slaved in the house and at the same time go out to earn a second living and what do I get? Some woman to share my marriage and the fortune I helped to provide for our children. Half of it now goes to the new wife who came in with just a bag of clothes,” Ms Suleimany said.

Ms Suleimany said she and her husband took a joint bank loan before he married again to build a second home.

“The second home that he now lives in with his second wife is partly my effort,” Ms Suleimany added. “I understand Islam allows men to have two wives, but it is hard for most women to accept that when the only reason is just to get a younger model.”

Other marriage counsellors have little sympathy for first wives. “In my opinion, women have only themselves to blame for letting themselves go. They need to look after themselves and stay attractive,” Safiya Suleiman, a 58-year-old marriage counsellor, said.

Ms Suleiman said men in their 40s and 50s are more likely to marry second wives than any other age group.

“They want to revive their youth and stay young, and a very young second wife is just the thing for them,” Ms Suleiman said.

But many ask why young women would accept a marriage proposal by married men twice their age.

“Middle-aged men are usually well-off financially. Some young women don’t want to struggle with men of their own age. Another reason is that it is difficult in our society for women to land a husband after the age of 25. They become a prime target for middle-aged, wealthy men,” Ms Fallahy said.

But Ms Suleimany dismissed Ms Suleiman’s suggestion. “That is stupid advice and I am surprised that, as a woman, she would say that. It is biologically impossible to retain one’s youthfulness as one ages. Besides, women look beyond wrinkles, can’t men do the same?” she said.

Nasser Kindy, a 56-year-old businessman who took a second wife two years ago, refuted the popular belief that men who take second wives simply want to boost their libidos.

“Far from the truth… most men with two wives do that because their first one turned the house into sheer hell,” Mr Kindy said. “At my age, I want peace of mind and not constant nagging all day long. The home of my second wife is an escape route when the first wife starts to blow the roof.”

But Mr Kindy conceded that polygamy is not always an enviable lifestyle.

“Children from the first wife can be rebellious, causing constant friction… And your two families can never be close, virtually becoming lifelong enemies,” Mr Kindy said.

Clerics say the practice often leads to disputes over inheritance.

“Usually, the children of the first wife, being much older than the second wife’s children, tend to take more than their share after their father’s death, resulting in bitter court lawsuits,” Sheikh Salim al Amry, imam of a mosque in Muscat, said.

Many second wives also say they often have contentious relationships with their co-wives. “We are called ‘husband snatchers’ by first wives. If anything, it is their fault for not satisfying their husbands,” Khadija Marhoon, 33, the second wife of an army officer, said. “Yes, there are problems… I personally don’t care as long as I get what I need.”

salshaibany@thenational.ae

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Rights, the law and religion: Islamic courts in East Africa

In Tanzania too there has been a raging debate over the introduction of the Kadhi’s courts in the legal and judicial system. Like in Kenya, the most vocal and visible opposition against Kadhi’s courts assumes a religious character, with the church being at the forefront of those most hostile to its introduction. But the motion to reinstate Kadhi’s Courts in Tanzania was first introduced by an opposition leader, the Honourable Lyatonga Mrema of the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), undoubtedly as a political strategy to win Muslim support in the 2005 General Elections. The ruling party is said to have appropriated the motion, turning it into a campaign pledge to make the same a reality in exchange for the Muslim vote. Not surprisingly, as the 2010 elections loom, the issue is gaining renewed vigour.

Religious forces have kept the matter very much alive in various spaces, including pulpits, newspapers and blogs, intensifying the pressure on the government to concede on the issue. Using a variety of advocacy channels, some Islamic bodies institutions have embarked on a media advocacy strategy aimed at consolidating Muslim opinion over the introduction of the Kadhi’s court. Dismissive remarks by the Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda during the 2009 budget session on the issue of the Kadhi elicited a harsh reaction from Muslim quarters. To appease the situation, the chief mufti, Sheikh Shaaban Simba, formed a committee to advise and negotiate with the government over the matter. In response, the prime minister also formed a committee to engage with the Muslim Council.

Concrete proposals to introduce Kadhi’s courts failed to come up during the recently concluded parliamentary session in November. In the meantime, the government has directed the Law Reform Commission to collect views and make recommendations on the matter. Women’s voices are noticeably absent from the discussions. From available reports, there is no female representation on this crucial body, advising on the most intimate aspect of family and social relationships.

This absence of women’s interest in the ongoing discussion is not only a physical absence but also an absence of gender considerations in the overall content of the proposals in substance. Largely, the voices of women have been sidelined or muffled by political forces informing the debate. Yet, it is they who stand to loose the most from what is being proposed. Indeed, the overwhelming interest in Kadhi’s courts does not seem to be a preoccupation of Muslim women, but of sections of the Muslim community who seek political advantage both from political parties and in the larger community. Otherwise, it consumes most those sections of the community who stand to benefit the most from the existence of Kadhi’s courts.

Pambazuka - Rights, the law and religion: Islamic courts in East Africa

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Sudan's Colonized Judiciary (Book Review)

by Alex de Waal from Making Sense of Darfur


It’s an unfortunate reality that books on Sudan by Sudanese authors—even those who have a wonderful English writing style, and who deal with their subject matter in a way that combines insight with accessibility—rarely get the attention they deserve.

We should take a close look at Abdullahi Ibrahim’s recently-published history of the Sudanese judiciary: Manichaean Delirium: Decolonizing the Judiciary and Islamic Renewal in the Sudan, 1898-1985. Abdullahi writes as an insider to Sudan’s Islamist intellectual and political tradition, and illuminates why not only the law, but the judiciary as well, was an arena of such significant political contest in colonial and post-colonial Sudan. He places contemporary Sudan within the wider post-colonial experience, using Frantz Fanon’s paradigms of the opposition between the European/canonical and the native/deviant, using the divided judiciary as his case.

British rule in Sudan, as elsewhere, was marked by a talent for divide and rule. This has been much-remarked in the context of the ‘native administration’ system, developed in the 1920s in order to marginalize the educated ‘detribalized’ elites whom, the British feared, would challenge their rule. The rural aristocracy was empowered—within very strictly defined limits—and became tarnished as ‘collaborators’ within the dominant nationalist political discourse. Sharia judges were also allocated their tightly-defined status within the system: low.

Abdullahi documents how the colonial subjects’ experience of British rule was hierarchically ordered, from matters of dress to education to urban geography. He poses a set of dualities. The colonizers and their carefully-chosen effendi clients wore suits and polished shoes (jazma), while the rest wore jellabiyas and markubs—and could be punished for violating the dress code. Khartoum was the modern city, laid out in a grid (with diagonals, said to resemble the Union Jack), while Omdurman the ‘native’ town retained its disorderly street plan. (To this day the executive is in Khartoum and the legislature on the other side of the river.) The administration used the Gregorian calendar and collected regular taxes and dues; the traditional system used the Islamic calendar and collected the Islamic Zakat. Students destined for prestigious posts attended the secular Gordon Memorial College close to the Governor-General’s Palace in Khartoum, those relegated to local affairs went to the Mahad al Ilmi (Islamic College) in Omdurman.

Abdullahi’s account is made particularly vivid by his gift for anecdote and personal observation. He recounts a story told by an old folklorist whose life story he compiled, describing how the schoolboys of Khartoum turned out for a parade in honor of a British colonial official. After long waiting in the sun, the officer arrived on his horse, inspected the schoolboys from the government schools but wheeled away at the very point where he came to the ranks of the boys from the khalwas (Quranic schools), who went away aggrieved, ‘staring into the void drilled by the refusal of that British official, the symbol of power and legitimacy, even to take notice of our presence.’

Abdullahi’s chief concern is how this duality translated into the legal sphere, relegating Islamic Law and its courts to second class status and a domestic sphere. Instead of being a nationally unifying factor, Sharia became a divisive issue. The qadis (judges) of the Sharia Division were junior to the ‘authoritative’ Civil Division. Qadis were required to wear a version of traditional garb including a turban (a dress code that some later adopted as a defiant gesture against western mores), were not entitled to receive salutes from policemen, and were widely ridiculed as ‘women’s judges.’ This refers to how the Sharia courts were visibly ‘women’s courts’, crowded with abandoned wives and their children and dispossessed widows hoping for the near-impossible to occur. Abdullahi notes that women preferred the Sharia courts to the tribal courts because Islamic law gives them more rights.

Imperial Sudan possessed neither a unified legal code nor a single judicial system. Among the majority, the sense of moral injury generated by the distinct second-class status of their own customary legal system, generated a rage for justice, unmet in the formal courts. Post-colonial Sudan was little different: the ruling secularized elites despised the Sharia courts, insensitive to their political plight and history. From the first days of independence, the search for a unified judiciary became a central theme of Sudanese politics. Abdullahi describes how this struggle translated into a ‘rage for masculinity’ and a preoccupation with sexual morality (including especially prostitution and homosexuality) in public discourse. It is not insignificant that Hassan al Turabi is the son of a qadi. Abdullahi breaks new ground in situating Turabi’s political philosophy in his family background.

In two provocative chapters, Abdullahi provides an Islamist perspective on the politics of Nimeiri’s Islamism. He is critical of the Republican Brothers’ leader Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, for repudiating the Islamic courts—rubbing in their faces the fact of their colonial origin and their inability to implement their ruling, made in 1968, that he was an apostate. Abdullahi describes the popular support for Sharia as stemming more from people’s hostility to the (secular) courts with their slow and expensive procedures, than enthusiasm for Islam. Nimeiri’s September Laws held out the promise of a unified judiciary, but disappointed. Abdullahi concludes by noting that Sudanese political society remains in a Manichean trap, and implies that a certain madness, a ‘logic of daring,’ will be needed to escape from it.

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Muslims cautioned over guide to Tanzanian elections (The Citizen)

Muslims cautioned over document on elections
Minister says guidelines to be released on Friday should not cause disharmony

By Paul Dotto, Dar and Patty Magubira, Mwanza

The Government yesterday cautioned Muslim leaders against issuing a document similar to the controversial Catholic booklet containing guidelines for voters on how to choose leaders in next year's General Election.

The State Minister in the Prime Minister's Office (Policy, Co-ordination and parliamentary Affairs), Mr Philip Marmo, advised the religious leaders to avoid anything that could create disharmony in the country. He cited the Catholic Church document, which he said had sparked heated exchanges among politicians, professionals and even ordinary citizens.

But speaking in Mwanza during a requiem Mass for Bishop Anthony Mayalla, which was also attended by President Jakaya Kikwete (see separate story Page 3), top Catholic Church leader Polycarp Cardinal Pengo told the Government not to meddle in religious affairs by censoring evangelical circulars.

Cardinal Pengo was apparently responding to the recent criticism by some CCM and government officials of the Roman Catholic Church circular, which guides its followers on how to choose good leaders in the civic poll later in the year, and in next year�General Election.

Minister Marmo was reacting to the plan by leaders from the Supreme Council of Islamic Organisations and Institutions in Tanzania (Shura ya Maimamu), who have prepared a document called 'Mwongozo', which they say is intended to guide followers on important social and political issues ahead of October's civic vote and next year'selections.

However, the minister said the Government respects the freedoms of expression and worship enshrined in the Constitution.

"Religious leaders should keenly weigh and consider the possible effects before launching such documents. But I have no doubt that theirs will adhere to those principles and will not break any laws," he said.

"We believe that groups, which have been preparing directives as we approach the elections do so with good intentions of offering civic education. We don't expect them to dwell on politics and direct people on who to vote for, as this would be contrary to the Constitution," he added.

The secretary general of the Supreme Council of Islamic Organisations and Institutions in Tanzania, Sheikh Ramadhan Sanze, announced that their document on the forthcoming elections was ready and would be launched tomorrow at Mnazi Mmoja grounds in Dar es Salaam.

He said they had decided to launch it after the Government failed to take action following the release of the Catholic Church�s pastoral letter on civic rights.

Sheikh Sanze added: "We don't have any problem with the Church. Our target is the Government, which failed to respond to their document."

However, the clergyman explained that their preparations started long before the Catholics issued their pastoral letter and was, therefore, not necessarily a reaction to it.

"Even in 2005, we released similar civic education guidelines. However, what we are going to launch will now incorporate a reaction to the church document," he said.

The Shura ya Maimamu secretary general, Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, told The Citizen that more than 100 Imams from across the Mainland regions had put together a collective stand on the coming elections.

"We are not in the position to divulge the contents of the document at this point. But the main focus is on health, education, the economy, freedom of expression, and democracy," Sheikh Ponda said.

Ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi stalwart Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, who recently added fuel to the controversy on the Catholic document by asking the Church in his contribution in Parliament in Dodoma to consider withdrawing it, arguing that it posed a threat to country, declined to comment on the Muslim leaders' initiative.

When reached for comment, the veteran politician and long-serving former Cabinet minister, posed:"Why do you ask me about this? I have no comment."

Another ruling party MP, who is also on record as having strongly opposed the Church manual, Mr Manju Msambya, of Kigoma South, also declined to comment.

Speaking in Mwanza, Cardinal Pengo said the Government's attempt to censor the Church over the document was tantamount to trying to dictate to clerics how to write their evangelical circulars.

He directed Roman Catholic bishops around the country to stop issuing such circulars if the government criticism persisted.

Cardinal Pengo denouncing the Government criticism, cited Poland's past communist government, which tried to gag religious leaders, to no avail.

"I do not want to provoke anyone by saying this, but I want to know if Tanzania today is far from Poland�s communist government, and if the country is not heading in the same direction by trying to censor clerics' circulars," he said.

This, the cardinal said, was tantamount to the government to putting itself in God's shoes "as was the case with Poland�s communist leadership".

Our sister paper, the Sunday Citizen, exclusively broke the news in June that the Catholic Church issued an elaborate document, which was being circulated to its followers around the country to educate them on the qualities to look for when voting for leaders in next year's elections.


Since then, debate has been raging countrywide, with some critics, arguing that politicians are alarmed because the Catholic booklet also calls for electoral reforms before the elections.

The Church has rejected calls by politicians to withdraw the document, arguing that those opposed to it are either supporters of the mega corruption scandals in high places or beneficiaries.

However, some analysts have warned that the acrimonious debate on the Catholic civic education blueprint might lead to divisions along religious lines if not well handled.

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Islam and Music

Afropop magazine brings it again with an interesting interview about music and islam. Below is an excerpt:

B.E.: You also looked into the state of this debate about Islam and music in the contemporary American scene. Tell us about Sheikh Tamer Salim.

J.B.: I wanted to get a local perspective from the Muslim community on how teachings and ideas about music play out among Muslims here in the United States. So I went down to Bensonherst, here in Brooklyn, and visited with a young, up-and-coming cleric, Tamer Salim, 27 years old, three years in this country, fresh from Egypt where he was educated at the prestigious Al Azhar Islamic seminary. Tamer is a good-looking, broad smiling, very warm and engaging spiritual leader who has reached out to monotheistic faiths with a hand of friendship and really gotten himself on the map here in New York as a respected Muslim cleric.

When I asked him about ideas about music within his own congregation, he told me:

Tamer Salim: Actually I am being asked about this issue all the time, because you know it’s very hard to avoid listening to music in this country. So when I came here to the United States, I found the people differing about this issue as well. And I found a group of people who are being raised, or even being born in this country, even those people who received their education in this country, who are following directly the rulings of Saudi Arabia, those people who are extreme when it comes to music and musical instruments. For me personally, I would consider it a very extreme view if you tell people not to listen to music in this country. But at same time, I would adopt the view of those moderate people that not every kind of music is worth listening to. So when the Muslim community would come to me asking about this, I would tell them, “Me personally, I don’t see anything wrong with music as long as the content of the music doesn’t have anything contradicting to Islamic culture, or Islamic law.

J.B.: Sheikh Tamer took pains to distinguish himself from the Salafi position, which has that default restrictive attitude toward so many different types of music. He actually made the point that Islam encourages many forms of art, including music, starting with the recitation of the Koran itself:

Tamer Salim: Allah told us to beautify reading and reciting the Koran. If you listen to the Koran from a good reciter, you would find this kind of beauty. Islam is requiring of us that we never read the Koran without making it beautiful in the ears of the people. We try to sing it in a good way. We try to make it affect the hearts of the people who would listen to it. The same is true of the Azan, which is the call for prayer. And actually, at the time of the prophet, when people wanted to make Azan, the Prophet said, ‘Leave that to Bilal,’ one of the companions of the Prophet. Bilal used to have a very beautiful voice when it came to saying the Azan itself. The Prophet would not let just anybody make the call for prayer. He would choose those people who had beautiful voices in order to have an impact on the hearts and the minds of the people. So we are here encouraged in many ways to listen to the beautiful voices of the people, and Islam is encouraging that.

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Can You See My Voice: A Modest Manifesto

Received this over the Facebook from a sister in the struggle; it addresses the issue of conceding reason and the mind in religious belief, and it does so not from the perspective of an 'insider' so to speak, a believer. This relates to my conversations with my brother the follower of Ahlus al-Sunnah. What place can reason have at all if one does not trust it to make basic ethical decisions? We were driving to class the other day, and this same brother brought up the Palestinians as a people who were "being judged by Allah." As I pointed out that the Palestinians suffering was due mainly to being dispossessed by militant Zionists, he kept pointing out how the Palestinians brought moral degeneracy wherever they went in the world. I was totally disgusted. How can one attribute a people's suffering to Allah without considering the logical, historical reasons behind their suffering? Can one presume to know the mind of Allah such that one knows when She is punishing her creation? Anyway, the article is primarily about hijab, another practice mistakenly deemed "compulsory" in Islam.

Can You See My Voice? A 'Modest' Manifesto
By Inas Younis

Although I am typically cloaked in full hijab, when it comes to writing, I am always naked in both spirit and understanding. I prefer neither to cater to the vulnerability of those who approach every Islamic initiative with a defensive posture, nor to those who come equipped with preconceived and borrowed ideas, and for whom spiritual conviction is precluded by a state of chronic ignorance and religious constipation.

I am addressing readers who have an absolute confidence in their ability to think.

Fifteen years ago, I attended a Muslim youth conference where I was persuaded to yield to the anguish of an entire Umma (nation) by submitting in full blind faith to a strain of Islam championed by the Afghani rebels (pre-Taliban), who had been invited to motivate us into religious compliance. They appealed to our sentiments by way of an original anthem, exhorting us to hear the weeping of Afghanistan's most innocent victims – the orphans. But words and songs were not required when their paralyzed and amputated bodies served as the most powerful testament to the sacrifice they had made in the name of Islam.

A seed of guilt was planted by the suggestion that our Islamic Umma was reaping punishment because of our religious apathy. And as a condition to our collective survival, we were beckoned to atone for our shortcomings by submitting ourselves to the "cause." The nature of that cause was masked with a generic plea to vindicate the suffering of Muslims by volunteering to amputate something less valuable to a teenager than bodily limbs—our infantile minds. We were called to commit practically, to that which we had been taught to embrace ideologically. It was hardly a sacrifice considering that at fifteen my mind was practically and ideologically constrained by only one thought: the boys on the other side of our segregated lecture hall. But before I could surrender my moral autonomy, I had to extinguish a few reservations.

And so in a public forum I asked the visiting scholar to explain the significance of polygamy. And he replied that "it is a social solution for a social problem." Then I questioned him about hijab , the Islamic headcovering. He pronounced that it is a fard , a religious obligation, on all women. So although I had come in wearing jeans and a sweatshirt, I left in full modest regalia, head scarf and all.

I knew almost nothing of religion, but it did not matter, because knowledge was a minor technicality in light of the precedence that crying orphans commanded. I knew that I must act before I think, because as even the ancient Christians proclaimed, lex orandi, lex credendi , action precedes faith. Now I am thirty years old and a little more difficult to satisfy, and although I still believe that action precedes faith, I am convinced that it is the action of the mind, not the body, which precedes not only faith, but the physical action itself. Fifteen years have passed, and my commitment to faith has not betrayed the cries of the orphans in Afghanistan. In fact, it has only become aggravated by the cries of routinely overlooked victims of persecution—Muslim women. Women's voices are being used, with or without their consent, to wage a resistance movement designed to use them as props in counteracting western colonialism.

Observe the concrete example of this onslaught on women as embodied by the person whom I shall dub "the heart surgeon." I cannot name her, or describe her, because the person who related his recent interaction with this gifted female surgeon, who had saved his life after he suffered a heart attack, has never "seen" her voice. She was clad in black from head to toe and had but two slits in her face veil to allow her a restricted view of a world that was prepared to capitalize on the brilliance of her mind, as if it were a public commodity, without acknowledging her person. A world where she is told to allow her talents to be plundered for the benefit of her intellectual inferiors without the incentive of recognition and respect. A world which insists that her orthodoxy is a testament of her elevated status instead of what it has really become—a visual manifestation of her subjugation.

But what the world of the female surgeon has imposed through physical coercion, ours has sanctioned through the psychological coercion inherent in the decree made by the consensus of those scholars who insist that the peripheral custom of veiling is mandated in Islam. A claim which, I have come to discover, is grounded less on theological evidence than on the religious vulnerability which seeks to use the visual imagery of women as an antidote to the helplessness we are experiencing at the hands of western dominance.

Frustrated by all these visual and intellectual contradictions in my faith, I sought out that very scholar who had satisfied my questions some fifteen years ago. Although he did not remember me, one peek into his lowered gaze and I was satisfied with the purity of his heart.

This time however, I had no mercy on him and started at the very beginning, by concerning him with the question of God. He replied that there are some things you cannot understand or explain. And after I felt hammered by that realization a few more times, I elected to dispose of the esoteric questions and get down to concretes. And so I asked him concerning the modern value of enforcing the hijab. He said that it is his opinion that it is obligatory, but of course a woman can choose.

But where is the choice when her salvation and love for God is contingent on her willingness to comply with those opinions you deem compulsory to circumventing a grievous penalty? So he wisely resorted to the same answers I received from the many
other people whose counsel I sought and finally said, "There are some things you just have to accept, and Allah has commanded it so." I asked him what he thinks I ought to do with my inconsolable mind. He declared, "Where your mind ends, revelation begins." Hence I was left without answers, but I was content nonetheless by the reassurance that answers are not always possible and I should finally take consolation in faith—thus god, thus divine law, thus salvation.

I was prepared to accept matters as they are decreed even if they did not appeal to my intellect. But before I could take one day's comfort in that realization, another irksome question demanded to be asked. What of those matters that contradict human intellect? For even if I succumb to intellectual apathy and blind faith I could not ignore the visual contradiction embodied in that female surgeon. Dumb was one thing, but dumb and blind was more than I could bear to sustain. If I drive myself to accept that my common sense, my intellect, is extraneous in matters of faith, then I must not only accept the corollary of that assertion, but also its remedy—dogma and literalism.

If I am not permitted to exercise my uniquely human capacity to integrate and conceptualize reality as I experience it then I too would be bound to the same prescriptions which compel that female surgeon to apply religious mandates across every situation no matter what her circumstances dictate. Some environments are innately devoid of any sexual context, where notions of modesty or vanity, female vs. male are completely immaterial, as would be the case in an operating room.. Hijab in the context of some environments, much less extreme than hospitals, does the exact opposite of its intended purpose—it injects the notion of sexuality where none exists. But before we even bother about arguments on the letter vs. spirit of the law, we have to be aware of an even greater, more insidious danger to the natural progression of literal thinking and that first axiom of blind obedience which we have been called to embrace.


THE INTELLECT vs. ISLAMIC LAW

If the things we cannot explain and do not understand are the means by which we seek to reinforce our belief in God's presence, if accepting religious law submissively without question, laws and fatwas which are not grounded in intellect but on vague interpretations of revelation, are the greatest reinforcement we have of the validity of any religious claim, then the measure of faith in God becomes contingent on the degree to which one is willing to forgo logic.

What happens when one is able to intellectualize the rigidity of dogma out of existence, is that then tantamount to intellectualizing god out of existence? Is the God who demands adherence in defiance of logic and reason, not the God of superstition? If we accept what we are told, that static laws are moral truths, and then allow others to attach our adherence to them as a testament of our commitment to God, then ask yourself if you are willing to act on it, without just applying it to others and then using repentance as a scapegoat to exempt yourself.

Ask yourself if you are willing to live according to the dictates of the faith-minus-logic world of that female surgeon. Or will you continue to rely on the luxury that a free society permits you by evading the very real and more pertinent question here: do you believe that you have a right not to believe, and still be a believer?

Are you prepared in the name of the God who granted you free will to renounce the attitude towards faith that relies on your ability to not justify things, to not understand, and worse, to resist the temptation to know them, making renunciation of the mind a qualification of faith in God.

If you can't bring yourself to do it, then you are not alone. Countless doctors, scientists, and professionals at the height of their academic fields become absolute numbskull idiots when it comes to matters of religion.

Observe the man who needs confirmation on whether or not he should divorce the woman he loves, should it please his mother, or if he can be alone in an exam room with his female patients? Here is a man who is trained to make life and death judgment calls but cannot make the simplest decisions when it comes to his personal life or work.

Or notice the woman who asks if dancing is permitted if only for her husband. But what is even more absurd than the questions are the answers they were given, which were—yes, divorce her; no you can't be alone with your patient; and yes, you can dance for your husband as long as you do not imitate that infidel Brittany Spears. For more comical examples of the intellectual liquidation of our Umma I refer you to www.sunnipath.com, a site I was referred to by an even more mainstream organization, the Zaytoona Institute.

What is not so comical is the sense of urgency which is driving Muslims to abdicate their commitment to a rational faith in the interest of the anti-rational dogma of legalism according to and championed by our leadership, the abstraction of which can be embodied by a scattered collection of voices who have been eulogizing the merits of an Islamic state, all the while ignoring the reality and corruption which is our Islamic "state."

But here is the secret fear of our leadership, of our mullahs, from which all their irrational decrees are designed to hold back and deflect. It is the deep down realization that the literal materialization of everything they have been preaching has already been actualized in one of the most loyal, literal and failed experiments in Islamic history, Saudi Arabia, the land that is the logical conclusion of our illogical approach to religion. They will of course go into a diatribe about how that sham of a kingdom is not an Islamic ideal but rather its corruption, but they will not be able to tell you why. Not because they do not know why, but because to answer the question why, you have to be prepared to follow through with the answer and its subsequent implication—making public that which you have already painfully conceded in private, proclaiming your independence from every authority that up and till now has held us all emotionally detained and united under a philosophically flimsy banner of blind compliance to Islamic laws which are intellectually indefensible.

Proclaim your independence from laws which have kept women physically or psychologically gagged and men spiritually impotent. Say your farewell to edicts which are supposed to reinforce revelation, but have in essence denied its most fundamental premise, the premise where your mind ends and revelation does indeed begin. Your mind ends at the very beginning, with the most fundamental question and answer from which every other question and answer should stem. Are humans inherently good or evil?

It is with this question that Revelation kicks in with undeniable force and tells me what my intellect cannot, which is that humans are inherently good, a premise which not only makes my faith unique, but which is also one of the firmest of my religious beliefs.

Since our revelation stresses our inherent goodness, our fitra, then it stands to reason that the letter of the law is a superfluous mechanism in harnessing our nature, which revelation says is predisposed to goodness. No legalism or holy spirits are required for guidance if and when our natural proclivity is allowed to serve as our most qualified guide. But our natural inclination is not a given; it is a product of a soul that is under no compulsion, a soul which is completely free. Natural inclinations can only find representation in a world that is free of every variety of coercion and intimidation, making a free society the organic expression and incarnation of an Islamic state, and the more free the society, the more Islamic it becomes.

No amount of rationalizations or explanations can convince any thinking person that a stricter adherence to the codification of our traditions will cure our current crisis. We must stop insisting that ideological unity is measured by uniformity in practice and recognize that ideals are abstract and timeless and their implementation and will have different expressions depending on time, culture, place and circumstance. We should also recognize that pity and loyalty to the feeble minded and spirited of society who seek security through unity and uniformity is a betrayal and a crime against the intellectually gifted members of our society, who will either, in an effort to alleviate their anguish, use their intellectual prowess to become the most destructive force in the trend towards fundamentalism, or leave religion for the masses, and become either disgruntled atheists or mystics.

If uniformity in practice continues to become the standard by which we derive and uphold religious law, instead of reality and intellect, then we will forever be compelled to yield to the lowest common unifying denominator where the exceptions become the rules, the hypotheticals become the standard, and the what ifs become the what should be. And in order to insure uniformity in practice, scholars will be forced to spend their lives making concessions for every single legal contingency. And Islamic scholarship, philosophy, and art will have to be sacrificed in order to relieve the constipation which results from questions like: What if it rains in the morning, can I join my prayers? What if my shorts are one eighth of an inch above my knee? What if my wife kisses me before I had the chance to stop her, should I repeat my wudu?

These sorts of questions become completely legitimate when reason is isolated from religion.

You have only to look at the reality which is our present state to recognize that where there is impotence of the mind and spirit, there is subjugation of the body, specifically women's bodies. If man is the metaphor for the material world, the world of progress and development, then woman is his spiritual counterpart. Man's spirit is bound by his capacity to produce, and whenever man feels he has no power to effect change or to produce material goods, woman becomes the mirror of his castrated spirit. In an effort to alleviate his paralysis in the physical world, he will seek to bind and gag the spirit which demands he fight for it, the spirit which is woman, the spirit whose movements he seeks to control to compensate himself for the tyrannical politics of bigger men who seek to control him.

To resuscitate men's minds, I would like to propose that we initiate a movement to liberate the male spirit by psychologically and physically liberating women from the impositions of religious mandates that are no longer relevant or sanctioned either in letter or spirit. We should do this one scarf at a time, by reevaluating the directive imposed on women to cover their hair and demanding that our scholars publicly declare their confidence in our capacity to think abstractly and redefine ideals of modesty according to the customs and sanctions of current mores. We should acknowledge that anything exceeding those expectations is a testament to a woman's personal desire to hold herself accountable to an individual standard not to be imposed collectively on the entire female population.


DECONSTRUCTING THE VEIL-AS-OBLIGATION MYTH

In advocating for personal ijtihad (independent reasoning), I am imploring that we rediscover, not eradicate, the Islamic sciences. (For an intelligible book on Sharia, I refer you to Islam: A Sacred Law, by Imam Feisal Abdul-Rauf.)

Here, I will examine only one example from Islamic law, which is the command made, through consensus of the scholars, that women must cover their hair. Let us examine the legitimacy of this directive based upon our Islamic sources of guidance minus their entirely male interpretations.

Historically, the custom of veiling and secluding women was not common in the Islamic world until about three generations after the Prophet's death. This form of dress was adopted from earlier pre-Islamic Near Eastern societies. Jews and Christians also covered their hair. And even
then, the veil was not worn by all women. It was a mark of status worn by women of the upper classes, not by peasants or slaves. It was never a unique or essential practice in Islam, and the Quran did not command all women to cover their heads. The primary source of evidence for its implementation is obtained from Surah an-Nur, which says:

And say to the believing women to lower their gaze and
guard their modesty; that they should not display
their Beauty and ornaments except what (must
ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw
their veils over their bosoms and not display their
beauty…." (24:31, Abdullah Yusef Ali)

The noun khimar, which is translated here as "veil," was worn in pre-Islamic times either as an ornament let down loosely over the wearer's back, or as a protection from the desert climate. Not covering your head was considered a bad practice, as was shaving the beard. Your reliability was questioned when either custom was not followed, in the same way that our current culture questions the reliability of those who don body piercings or tattoos. In accordance with the fashion prevalent at the time of the Prophet, the upper part of a woman's dress had a wide opening in the front, leaving her breasts exposed. Hence the injunction to cover the bosom by means of a khimar is intended to make it clear that a woman's breasts are not included in the concept of "what may decently be apparent" of her body and should be covered.

The significance of the verse is concerned with covering the breast area, juyubihinna, as the verse has also reinforced. There is also no sanction or punishment for failing to observe Islamic dress, as there are punishments for adultery and murder.

The interpretation of the phrase illa ma zahara minha by several of the earliest Islamic scholars is what a human being may openly show in accordance with prevailing custom. Although the traditional interpreters of Islamic law have been disposed to restrict the definition of "what may (decently) be apparent" to a woman's face, hands and feet, the meaning of illa ma zahara minha is really much wider. The intentional ambiguity of this phrase is to allow for variability in practice according to customs and personal interpretations of modesty.

However there are also other verses which can be taken into consideration when deciding on appropriate dress, such as the specific commands about seclusion (al-Ahzab 33:32-33) which apply only to the Prophet's wives who, as the Qur'an asserts, are unlike any other women. Keep in mind that in traditional Arab society a sexual scandal was a very serious matter that could have been used to discredit the Prophet's mission. The hijab or curtain that was imposed on the Prophet's wives was a measure used to curtail the possibility of false accusations against the Prophet's family. There is a reference to the generality of Muslim women in another verse which states:

O Prophet! Tell thy wives and thy daughters, as well
as all (other) believing women, that they should draw
over themselves some of their outer garments (when in
public): this will be more conducive to their being
recognized (as decent women) and not annoyed. But
(withal,) God is indeed much-forgiving, a dispenser of
grace! (al-Ahzab 33:59, Asad transl.).

The context of this verse is that some of the hypocrites were molesting women in the street. Accordingly, Muslim women were ordered to dress in a manner that would distinguish them as modest and chaste and not to be assaulted. One could argue that this command is bound b context and time, and as such, dress is used to indicate a Muslim's identity and not necessarily as a measure of the moral status of the woman herself. It would of course also be socially preferable to raise men to respect women and not think that a woman's dress can serve as an invitation or license to assault her.

When the objective of a decree is stated in the Quran, then it is the objective, not the decree, which should take precedence in one's interpretation. One can claim that in light of the current situation we are facing, wearing the hijab has rendered women more of a target for the ill intentioned, and as a precautionary measure, one should not wear the hijab. I would never suggest that this is a good argument, but it certainly will quiet those who imply that the aim of hijab is to protect women.

The final verse with respect to veiling says: As for your women past the age of bearing children, who have no hope of marriage, there is no harm if they take off their outer garments, but in such a way that they do not display their charms; yet if they avoid this it would be better for them. God is all-hearing, all-knowing. (an-Nur 24:60)

Not one of these verses commands a woman to cover her hair explicitly. Even implicitly the emphasis is not on suppressing a woman's natural inclination to be feminine but rather to emphasize that a woman should not dress in a manner that is sexually suggestive.

The other source of guidance we have on the matter of veiling are two hadiths, reported sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. The first of which is narrated below where Aisha said:

Asthma', daughter of Abu Bakr, entered upon the
Apostle of Allah (may peace be upon him) wearing thin
clothes. The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him)
turned his attention from her. He said: O Asthma',
when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does
not suit her that she displays her parts of the body
except this and this, and he pointed to her face and
hands.

Very few Muslims know that this is in Sunan Abu Dawud. The English translation of Sunan Abu Dawud is in three volumes. This hadith is in Volume 3, Book XXVII, Chapter 1535, and Hadith number 4092, titled: "How Much Beauty Can a Woman Display?"

Abu Dawud reports that this is a mursal tradition (i.e. the narrator who transmitted it from 'Aisha is missing), making this hadith a weak one. Few veiling advocates ever point out that this is a weak hadith and therefore should not be used to obtain Islamic
injunctions.

The other hadith, which is sahih (considered authentic), states:

My Lord agreed with me ('Umar) in three things... (2)
And as regards the veiling of women, I said 'O Allah's
Apostle! I wish you ordered your wives to cover
themselves from the men because good and bad ones talk
to them.' So the verse of the veiling of the women was
revealed (Bukhari, v1, bk 8, sunnah 395).

But again this was in reference to the Prophet's wives who were the target of insults and accusations by the "hypocrites." The majority of those who have attempted to interpret the Qur'an to mandate the hijab argue that the vernacular "beauty" includes hair, and its exposure is
therefore forbidden. But the term "ordinary'," means ordinary to the prevailing social customs. How is hair not "ordinary"?

The word "Hijab" itself is derived from hajaba, that is, to hide or conceal. Hijab/hajaba is mentioned eight times in the Quran. But Hijab is never used in the context of a woman's head covering. Even the word khimar really signifies any covering, such as a blanket, dress, or shawl.

What is clear, even after an analysis of various translations and even if one uses the word veil in translation, is an order that the woman's bosom be covered, not that the woman's head be covered. This is not to say that covering the hair does not carry noble connotations. My objective is not to destroy what I believe would be a beautiful custom if it were not marred by the decree that it is obligatory, depriving a woman from the sense of joy that she would derive from choosing it as a genuine expression of her interior state of purity and transcendent beauty.

My objective is to liberate every woman, myself included, who has only adopted the Islamic dress because she was misled into believing that it is an obligation, and even more importantly to liberate all the women who do not wear it from the unearned guiltthey harbor, for what they have been told is spiritual weakness on their part.

I got the impression from the many people I have spoken with that they would secretly agree with me but would rather not rock the boat over what they have, without our permission, deemed a minor issue. I pray that they will evolve the courage to forgo political correctness and stop hiding behind the pretense that it's the woman who is making the choice. Fear, of eternal damnation no less, nullifies the impression that it is a choice.

But my greatest motivation in seeking guidance on this issue was to speak on behalf of those who do not have the luxury to make an independent decision regarding their religious expression. For while I can take off my hijab, I know that the ramifications I, a mere housewife, will suffer in the hands of a few back biters and name callers will be negligible in comparison to the jail time and humiliation a female surgeon in Saudi Arabia would have to endure to assert her right to unveil.

When my friend was lying at the operating table, vulnerable and exposed, he was asked by the thoughtless man who was there to assist in the surgery to furnish some proof that he can pay for the superior quality heart tube which he demanded. The female surgeon terminated his coarseness by giving him her assurance that she would pay for it if my friend could not, proving that she is not only his superior in intellect but also in compassion.

My friend not knowing in what manner he would thank this angel of mercy, in what way he can make her feel singled out, without being rebuked for transgressing any social bounds, elected to do it by means of a poetic note of thanks. She took it from him as if it were a charge slip, only to rush back to plead with him to sign the note. In that act, she expressed both her nature and personality, for while she remains
nameless and faceless and claims no credit for her efforts, she insists that he be given credit for his.

And so in gratitude to the female surgeon who has healed and touched many hearts both literally and figuratively, I in a last literal and symbolic act of faith would like to take my hat off, or rather scarf off to you, my sister in Islam. For tomorrow I will go out unveiled for the first time in the hopes that the world will see you and me with new eyes and, more importantly, with enlightened hearts. And I am hoping
they will join me in public opposition to the veiling of your elegant mind and compassionate voice. A voice which, if it were allowed to sing freely, would triumph over the voices of those who either in their silent resignation or blatant endorsement have contributed to the horrors that will make September 11th both a day of awakening and tragedy for Muslims everywhere.

Inas Younis is a freelance writer residing in the
state of Kansas.

Copyright © 2003-2004 Muslim WakeUp! Inc.

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Allahu Akbar (The Method of Animal Sacrifice)

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The method of killing a goat for the Eid is as follows:

The method of slaughtering an animal is that the four main arteries of its neck should be completely cut (jugular artery, foodpipe, jugular vein and windpipe). It is not sufficient to split open these arteries or to cut off the neck. And the cutting of these four main arteries becomes practical when the cutting takes place from below the knot of the throat.

If a person cuts some of the four arteries and waits till the animal dies and then cuts the remaining arteries, it will be of no use. If the four arteries are cut before the animal dies, but the cutting was not continuous as is usually done, the animal is Pak and halal to eat. However, the recommended precaution is that they should be cut in continuous succession.

A person, a man or a woman, who slaughters an animal must be a Muslim. An animal can also be slaughtered by a Muslim child who is mature enough to distinguish between good and bad.

The animal should be slaughtered with a weapon made of iron. However, if an implement made of iron is not available, it should be slaughtered with a sharp object like glass or stone, so that the four veins are severed, even if the slaughtering may not be necessary, like when the animal is on the verge of death.

When an animal is slaughtered, it should be facing Qibla. If the animal is sitting or standing, then facing Qibla would be like a man standing towards Qibla while praying. And if it is lying on its right or left side, then its neck and stomach should be facing Qibla. It is not necessary that its legs, hands and face be towards Qibla. If a person who knows the rule, purposely ignores placing the animal towards Qibla, the animal would become haraam; but if he forgets or does not know the rule, or makes a mistake in ascertaining the Qibla, or does not know the direction of Qibla, or is unable to turn the animal towards Qibla, there is no objection. As a recommended precaution, the person slaughtering should also face Qibla.

When a person wants to slaughter an animal, just as he makes the Niyyat to slaughter, he should utter the name of Allah, and it suffices if he says 'Bismillah' only, or if he utters 'Allah'. But if he utters the name of Allah without the intention of slaughtering the animal, the slaughtered animal does not become Pak and it is also haraam to eat its meat. And if he did not utter the name of Allah forgetfully, there is no objection.

It is necessary that the blood should flow in normal quantity from the slaughtered animal. If someone blocks the vein, not allowing blood to flow out, or if the bleeding is less than normal, that animal will not be halal. But if the blood which flows is less because the animal bled profusely before the slaughter, there is no objection.

The animal should be slaughtered from its proper place of slaughtering; on the basis of recommended precaution, the neck should be cut from its front, and the knife should be used from the back of the neck.

As a precaution, it is not permissible to sever the head of the animal from its body before it has died, though this would not make the animal haraam. But if the head gets severed because of sharpness of the knife, or not being attentive, there is no objection. Similarly, it is not permissible to slit open the neck and cut the spinal cord before the animal has died.

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